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Policymaking as Design in Complex Systems— 
The International Climate Change Regime
Stephen Peake
Faculty of Mathematics, Computing and Technology, Open University, UK
This paper explores policymaking as a 
design process in complex systems using 
the example of the international climate 
policy regime. Applying Johnson’s (2008) 
framework on science and the designing 
of policy for complex futures, we establish 
that the evolution of international climate 
policy displays some characteristics of an 
ad hoc complexity-science policy-design 
process. The IPCC’s emissions scenario 
approach is used as an example of the cur-
rent climate-science policy regime’s ap-
proach to dealing with policy uncertainty. 
We conclude that such an approach fails 
to capture the true relationships between 
policymakers, the complex models they 
seek to design and the actual uncertainty 
inherent in the environment.  Further, we 
conclude that more formal linkages be-
tween climate policymaking and complex 
systems science could generate valuable 
new insights for both policymakers and 
scientists.  
Introduction
The emerging regime of international cli-mate policy is a global-scale real-time experiment in handling complex, inter-
related and emergent factors spanning envi-
ronmental, economic and social change. The 
formulation of climate policy is a century-scale 
sequential design process under uncertainty. 
In it we see a classic example of the coevolution 
of problem and solution through incremental 
advances in scientific understanding, coupled 
to political responses and changes of behavior. 
This paper explores the international climate 
policy regime from the perspective of policy 
making, framed as a design process informed 
by complex systems science. 
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Policymaking and Complexity
A Complexity Framework for Policy Making
Johnson (2008) argues that design, policy and complex models are closely entwined in real-world policy processes and sets out 
a framework for thinking about how decision 
making taking complexity into account differs 
from the traditional scientific method based on 
point predictions of the future. In this frame-
work, the policy design process is character-
ized by a number of elements:
1. Design begins with political commitment 
to address the problem in the form of per-
ceived needs/requirements and attempts 
to generate new approaches to satisfy those 
needs/requirements;
2. Acceptable solutions to what are often mul-
tiple constraint optimizations are sought;
3. These potential solutions are evaluated;
4. During the generation and evaluation of 
solutions, the problem definition may be 
transformed;
5. The design process initially generates a 
multilevel hypothesized representation of 
the new policy at high levels of abstraction;
6. Eventually a more precise statement of 
what the final approach will be and how 
it will be implemented emerges; a policy 
blueprint.
 In the domain of international climate 
change policymaking we can observe this 
process at work at these various levels/stag-
es—from the highest level formulation and 
negotiation of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and its Kyoto protocol, to more specific design 
processes around, for example, the clean de-
velopment mechanism and emissions trading 
schemes.
 We will now use Johnson’s framework 
to reflect on current international climate 
Applied
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change policy and explore whether this per-
spective helps to make sense of current prac-
tice.
Applying the Framework
Establishing Commitment, Elaborating Needs/
Requirements
Global commitment to addressing the prob-
lem of climate change was established with the 
adoption of the UNFCCC at the Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The objective of the 
UNFCCC is contained in its Article 2 as fol-
lows:
The ultimate objective of this Convention….
is to achieve…. stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient 
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate 
change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development 
to proceed in a sustainable manner. (UNFCCC, 
Article 2)
 Article 2 is the highest level design 
brief/requirement guiding the evolving archi-
tecture of the international climate policy re-
gime. As an over-arching statement of require-
ments Article 2 is highly abstract and leaves a 
great deal of work to be done to explore, agree 
and translate those requirements into plans of 
action. In particular, there is need to establish 
and accept globally:
• What should be the stabilization level for 
greenhouse gases to prevent ‘dangerous 
anthropogenic interference’?
• How soon should this be achieved?
Multiple Design Constraints in the Climate 
Regime
There is clear evidence of multiple design con-
straints in the climate regime that leads to col-
orful, political exchanges within the negotia-
tions; once again, article 2 is a good example. 
It seeks (a) to avoid dangerous anthropogenic 
interference, (b) to do so on meaningful time-
frames for ecosystems and (c) to enable sus-
tainable economic development. These are 
complex and multi-faceted goals which poten-
tially conflict.
 Considered as a whole, the myriad 
texts of the UNFCCC regime, including Kyoto 
Protocol, are essentially a complex design brief 
containing hundreds of often competing con-
straints. Some of the most striking are con-
tained in Articles 3 (Principles) and 4 (Com-
mitments). These include, for example:
The Parties should protect the climate system 
for the benefit of present and future generations 
of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities 
(Article 3.1). 
 Weighing up present and future ben-
efits and costs is fraught with methodologi-
cal difficulty. The furor in policy circles over 
the very low discount rate used in the Stern 
Review of the economics of climate change 
(Stern, 2006; Nordhaus, 2007) is a very clear 
example (Hulme, 2009). Equally, the notion of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ is 
a source of great conflict and tension that lies 
at the heart of current disputes about equitable 
responses to climate change. Another example 
is:
The Parties have a right to, and should, promote 
sustainable development (Article 3.4).
 There are few detailed operational 
agreements in place as to what constitutes a 
pathway for sustainable development (the 
Millennium Development Goals are a notable 
exception) which has three design goals/con-
straints: economic, social and environmental.
Potential Solutions are Generated and 
Evaluated
The UNFCCC is a ‘living agreement’ in that 
it has clauses that allow for revisions.  Article 
4.2b of the UNFCCC requests developed coun-
tries to return, individually or jointly, emis-
sions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases to their 1990 levels—but without men-
tion of a specific time frame. Shortly after the 
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UNFCCC entered into legal force, a new pro-
cess was launched to strengthen commitments 
to reduce greenhouse gases beyond the year 
2000. This was known as the Berlin Mandate 
and led to the creation of the Kyoto Protocol to 
the UNFCCC. 
 The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the 
end of 1997 and entered into force in 2005. It 
fulfilled the requirements of the Berlin Man-
date and published quantified legally-binding 
emissions targets for developing countries 
to be achieved by 2012. Interestingly, it took 
eight years from agreement to entry into force 
because nations had to elaborate a large num-
ber of specific rules and modalities (what con-
stitutes the definition of a ‘tree’; how exactly 
would new ‘mechanisms’ work such as the 
clean development mechanism and emissions 
trading schemes). 
 COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009 was 
part of the ongoing second major revision of 
the evolution of the design brief/requirements 
under the UNFCCC. It was a re-evaluation of 
the requirements of Article 2 given (a) new 
scientific understanding such as that con-
tained in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Re-
port (AR4) published in 2007 (IPCC, 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c) and (b) new global political 
understandings emerging from this scientific 
evidence (e.g., Stern 2008).
 So potential solutions have indeed 
been generated and evaluated and re-worked 
and those solutions remain complex, difficult 
to pin down and ambiguous.
Transformation of Problem Definition 
Overall, in nearly two decades, it could be ar-
gued that the design of the response to climate 
change has changed relatively little. Short-
term targets have been set and missed, me-
dium-term targets have been set and met by 
some, but missed by others; and a longer-term 
set of policy goals is slowly emerging, based 
on a risk approach to future global tempera-
ture increase. Since this is our one-and-only 
experiment in designing a climate policy re-
sponse, there is no obvious objective measure 
of the speed with which this is being achieved; 
however, there is evidence the process is accel-
erating. The two year negotiations leading up 
to Copenhagen Accord accomplished a great 
deal more that had been achieved in the previ-
ous decade. 
 During the first seventeen years of the 
climate change regime the definition of the 
problem has undergone considerable transfor-
mation from a focus on emissions targets to 
an agreement to limit global temperature in-
crease.
 Initially the emphasis was character-
ized by a focus on emissions targets for devel-
oping countries—specific targets to be met on 
certain dates (e.g., developed countries to re-
turn their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 
2000 in the UNFCCC). Recognition that the 
emphasis should be on emissions ‘pathways’ 
rather than specific yearly ‘check points’ led 
to the quinquennial approach adopted in the 
Kyoto Protocol, over a longer time frame. 
 Around 2005, the world’s science com-
munity focussed on and elaborated the scien-
tific interpretation of the phrase ‘dangerous 
anthropogenic interference’ (DAI) in Article 
2. The outcome was an injection into the pol-
icy process of probabilistic assessments of the 
likelihood of achieving temperature targets ac-
cording to different sets of potential emissions 
pathways (Schneider & Mastrandrea, 2005; 
Schellnhuber et al., 2006).
 The goal of limiting global temperature 
increases to 2oC by the early peaking of global 
emissions and their reduction by 50-80% by 
2050 (compared approximately with today) 
contained in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord 
represents a significant transformation of the 
problem definition. It exposes multiple com-
peting design constraints (fossil fuel energy 
use for development versus greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions) in the regime and re-
casts working policy time-frames from Kyoto’s 
rolling five year plans to a new forty year time 
horizon. 
 The problem is transformed from ne-
gotiation about leadership and how quickly 
developed countries can ‘turn off the emission 
tap’ into what is requisite to meet the global 
2oC design constraint.
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Representation of the New Approach at High 
Levels of Abstraction
At its highest level, the UNFCCC represents a 
model of relationship between human activity 
and the earth’s climate system. In this model 
there is the recognition that humans are a sub-
component of a complex system and that we 
are exerting a significant impact on the system. 
Classic visual expressions of this abstraction 
are the carbon cycle models and basic func-
tional outlines of global climate change Inte-
grated Assessment Models (IAMs). Under the 
UNFCCC, great methodological strides have 
been achieved in representing and accounting 
for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. 
Quantities of fuel (e.g., wood, coal) have been 
trackable to some extent for over a century, 
but systematic meaningful emissions account-
ing across a range of fuels and other sources of 
greenhouse gases (agriculture, waste, indus-
try) is a relatively new capability. The abstract 
carbon cycle is now embodied in greater detail 
in the framework of greenhouse gas invento-
ries. In theory, every real tonne of greenhouse 
gas emissions—whether it be from a car, a 
power station, a ruminant animal or the decay 
of flat-pack furniture dumped into a landfill—
is now observable to policymakers. 
 However, socio-technical systems are 
much more than flows of carbon; the flow of 
carbon is merely one level of understanding. 
Other levels are necessary to describe the sys-
tem—such as human activity, its drivers and 
its consequences. Embodied in the high-level 
abstraction is the understanding that humans 
can identify and isolate their impact, manage 
it, and that in turn the climate system can be 
managed. The notion that we can manage the 
system is so deeply rooted in the mind set of 
policymakers that it is invisible; it rarely sur-
faces as an assumption. However, the nature 
and scale of the complexity of the climate sys-
tem is such that we may already be nearing 
new states that make this assumption less val-
id—we may be near to tipping  into irreversible 
climate change (e.g., Lenton, 2008; Lovelock 
2006).
Final System Design—Towards a Climate Policy 
Blueprint?
We have no previous experience in managing 
century-scale planetary climate change and 
we are probably at least a quarter of a century 
away from any kind of ‘policy blueprint’; that 
is, a precise statement of what the final new 
system state should be. By 2100 we will have 
this experience.  We will spend this century 
on the process of climate regime design. Some 
opinion formers are turning their attention to 
backcasting, from say 2050, as a way of explor-
ing how we mismanaged/managed the design 
task in the intervening years.  The film, the Age 
of Stupid (2009), for example, takes a negative 
approach and explores how we failed to design 
an appropriate response, whereas Gore (2009) 
takes a positive approach and writes back from 
2050 outlining the decisions we took in or-
der to achieve our goal of having successfully 
avoided dangerous climate change. This envi-
sioning is an interesting approach to support 
the development of a policy blueprint.
Does the Complexity Science Framework Add 
Value? 
Using Johnson’s framework to reflect on cur-
rent approaches to the development of climate 
change policy suggests that it provides a rea-
sonably accurate picture of what has happened 
in practice. However this is not to say that poli-
cymaking has neatly followed the six-step pro-
cess of sequential designing/decision-making; 
in reality it has emerged in a much more ad-
hoc way over time. For example, as the require-
ments of the regime were initially proposed 
in 1992 (e.g., UNFCCC Article 2), the policy 
makers were busy blueprinting ‘solutions’. In 
the early days these were almost exclusively 
mitigation policies mainly focussed on cars 
and power stations. Nearly two decades later, 
the policy designers have learned to frame 
problems-solutions in a much wider context. 
Today there is a growing emphasis on policies 
to promote adaptation to climate change and 
a myriad mitigation solutions based on sev-
eral sectors (industry, domestic, agriculture, 
transportation) and several greenhouse gases 
(carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and 
others). 
19Peake
 There is no doubt that the climate poli-
cy regime is a living, learning design regime. It 
is perhaps a great deal messier than the ideal-
ized normative framework proposed by John-
son. However by embracing the core tenets of 
complexity science, which bring our attention 
to the inevitability that goals will conflict, that 
new problems and perspectives will emerge, 
that policies will need to be re-framed in the 
light of new evidence and changing circum-
stances, our future approach to designing cli-
mate policymaking could become faster and 
smarter. In other words, it is better if we em-
brace and plan for the inevitable complexity of 
the problem right from the beginning, rather 
than be surprised by it along the way.
 If the climate system is a good example 
of a complex system (and it is), then there is 
a strong case that the codesign process of cli-
mate policy formulation should be based on a 
more explicit complexity science perspective. 
Is there any evidence that this is happening? A 
key area to consider is how the science-policy 
process deals with systemic uncertainties in 
modelling climate futures.
Climate Policy as a Complex Systems 
Design Process Under Uncertainty 
The issue of uncertainty is gradually be-ing made more explicit in approaches to scenarios and modelling of climate out-
comes. In this section we give some examples 
as to how this uncertainty is being expressed 
and included.
The IPCC’s ‘Emissions Scenario’ Approach
In 2000, the IPCC published a “Special Report 
on Emissions Scenarios” (SRES). The report 
took into account several hundred greenhouse 
gas emissions models projections published in 
the literature as well as a detailed analysis of 6 
well known global emissions models (IPCC, 
2000). According to the IPCC:
Fut ure greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
are the product of very complex dynamic 
systems, determined by driving forces such 
as demographic development, socioeconomic 
development, and technological change. Their 
future evolution is highly uncertain. Scenarios 
are alternative images of how the future might 
unfold and are an appropriate tool with which 
to analyze how driving forces may influence 
future emission outcomes and to assess the 
associated uncertainties. They assist in climate 
change analysis, including climate modeling 
and the assessment of impacts, adaptation, 
and mitigation. The possibility that any single 
emissions path will occur as described in 
scenarios is highly uncertain. (IPCC, 2000: 3)
 The SRES generated a set of scenari-
os based on differing assumptions about the 
range of emissions drivers. These were associ-
ated with a narrative based on (a) a regional/
global emphasis on economic integration and 
(b) a degree of emphasis on economic/envi-
ronmental goals.
 The IPCC’s emissions scenarios have 
played a critical role in the communication 
of scientific understanding of future climate 
change since they were introduced. Different 
climate modelling teams have been able to run 
the same emissions scenarios (sets of ‘driv-
ers’—population, economic growth, techno-
logical characteristics of energy supply sys-
tem for example) and publish the associated 
climatological predictions according to their 
models. Alternative emissions scenarios lead 
to alternative ranges of temperature predic-
tions—many overlapping each other. In other 
words, the scientific uncertainty of how much 
the earth will warm for a given emissions tra-
jectory (scenario) is considerable. 
 It is important to note that the IPCC’s 
scenario approach treats all SRES emissions 
scenarios as equally probable.  The range of un-
certainty surrounding future climate predic-
tion is therefore compounded in that it must 
take into account a broad range of future emis-
sions trajectories from very low to very high. 
Discussion: How Effectively is Uncertainty 
Being Addressed?
The IPCC’s scenario approach is a response to 
the complexity of predicting future greenhouse 
gas emissions. It is an attempt to simplify the 
problem for policymakers. However, there are 
three important features of the IPCC’s scenario 
methodology that are important to note from a 
20 E:CO Vol. 12 No. 2 2010 pp. 15-22
complexity science perspective: 
1. The basis of the scenario set is confusing. 
The IPCC specified 11 points for the SRES 
writing team in 1997. One of them stated 
that the new scenarios should “exclude 
additional initiatives and policies specifi-
cally designed to reduce climate change” 
(IPCC, 2000: 25). In other words the range 
of scenarios represents ‘non-climate-inter-
vention’ futures. In practice, humans are 
likely to adapt in a complex anticipatory 
way to climate change—due, for example, 
to increased awareness, increased taxes and 
costs. 
2. The integrity of assumptions on driv-
ing forces is questionable. According to 
the IPCC, ‘The ranges over which driving 
forces vary are large…of these …GDP and 
population are often exogenous…’(IPCC, 
2000: 100). This assumption is completely 
at odds with scientific evidence that  higher 
temperatures will have negative systemic 
economic and human health impacts for at 
least some countries/regions/sectors; in 
other words, to treat economic and popu-
lation factors as exogenous is highly ques-
tionable. 
These scenarios take no account of the link, 
made by Hulme (2000), for example, between 
climate assessment and climate outcomes:
Yet it is this reflexive relationship between climate 
science and wider society that makes the ultimate 
goal of climate prediction ultimately chimeric—
we will never ‘know’ what future climate will be 
because the process of estimating future climate 
alters the very driving forces that shape that 
climate (Hulme, 2000).
 The climate science community’s ap-
proach (both caused by, and reflected in the 
work of the IPCC) to modelling socio-eco-
nomic-technical systems uncertainty has 
come under increasing scrutiny in recent years 
(Schenk & Lensink 2007; Smil, 2008; Pielke et 
al., 2008; Schiermeier, 2008; Girod & Flueler, 
2009). A new generation of scenarios is emerg-
ing in time for the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the IPCC due to be published in 2013 (Moss 
et al., 2010). A key aim is to speed up the way 
that scenarios are used in climate assessment. 
A further aim is to address the criticism of the 
current approach that alternative combina-
tions of driving forces can lead to similar lev-
els of GHG emissions. While climate analysts 
continue to focus on emissions, others (e.g., 
economists, systems scientists) might focus 
on the driving forces (population, economic 
output, technologies) and yet others (e.g., bi-
ologists) on impacts.
Conclusions 
The evolution of the international cli-mate-science policy regime demon-strates some characteristics of John-
son’s framework based on considerations of 
complexity science. There is, for example, 
evidence of the coevolution of problem/solu-
tion within the IPCC-UNFCCC policy process 
and a growing recognition that the formula-
tion of climate policy is more than sequential 
decision-making under uncertainty but does 
in fact require consideration of complex, inter-
related, conflicting and emerging goals in light 
of changing outcomes and priorities. In prac-
tice, climate policymaking is indeed reacting 
to complexity by morphing its decision pro-
cesses in response to this uncertainty. As new 
information is gained/generated new waves of 
subjective judgements around climate change 
policy analysis reverberate within the system. 
Some recent examples of science-policy shifts 
that demonstrate this effect at work include:
• An emerging consensus that a goal of 80% 
reductions in global GHG emissions by 
2050 is necessary to avoid ‘dangerous an-
thropogenic interference’;
• A re-imagination of sectoral contribu-
tions—recognition of the role of forests, 
livestock/agriculture/nonCO2 GHGs—it 
is no longer all about cars and power sta-
tions; 
• A recognition of the importance of adap-
tation—gradually the policy process is as-
similating the importance of adapting to 
climate impacts that we are committed to 
even in the most optimistic scenario; 
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• A sophistication of argument around pol-
icy menus focussing on unilateral devel-
oped country emissions reductions—e.g., 
the issue of embodied carbon in China’s 
exports;  
• A willingness to challenge and incorporate 
decisions on powerful vested industry in-
terests (e.g., tackling aviation emissions 
and international marine bunker emis-
sions). 
Johnson asserts that the science of complex 
systems is inextricably entwined with policy 
and design: 
However, policy is, possibly, the only laboratory 
available to complex systems scientists to make 
in vivo observations of real complex socio-
technical systems. The laboratory is controlled 
and financed practically by decision makers. 
The only way for scientists to collect the data 
they need is to work with policy makers: the 
science of complex socio-technical systems has 
no choice but to engage in policy, and to justify 
its participation by adding value to the design, 
implementation, management and control of 
new systems (Johnson, 2008: 521).
 Policymakers have yet formally to rec-
ognise, embrace and embed complexity sci-
ence methods in their slow (multi-decadal) in 
vivo experimentation with the climate. The 
state of scenario analysis (e.g., describing ‘non-
policy’ scenarios) in support of IPCC’s review 
of the climate science literature shows this to 
be far from the case. To complex systems sci-
entists, the idea of a ‘non-intervention climate 
scenario’ is absurd and yet in the world of IPCC 
climate science it is all we have, for now. 
 On the other hand, sceptical policy-
makers might observe that there is a naïve in-
nocence about the idea of entwining policy-
making with recognition of complexity and 
uncertainty to design better futures. Ultimate-
ly, trying to assume things are more certain 
than they are is time-wasting and ineffective, 
as we have seen.
 Embracing complexity in climate poli-
cy formulation does not have to mean an ex-
plosion of uncertainty, the loss of control and 
the risk to policy ‘optimality’. On the contrary 
it is a way—possibly the only way—to arrive at 
a realistic solution. Indeed by its nature, a com-
plexity science approach would challenge the 
idea of a unique ‘solution’ and certainly the no-
tion of optimality.   
 Policy based on sound ‘science’ is a 
mantra in the climate science-policy commu-
nity and by ‘science’ we typically mean ice and 
mud cores, atmospheric modelling. However, 
the IPCC’s remit also includes the economic, 
social and human sciences—though it is recog-
nized among climate academics that social sci-
entists are underrepresented in the IPCC (e.g., 
Hulme, 2009: 98) and the media coverage is 
heavily biased towards hard ‘real’ science.
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